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ABSTRACT:
This paper lays out the logic of a conservative view of liberty and morality
based on an understanding of human nature as both social and rational on
the one hand, and radically individual and self-seeking on the other.
Without public virtue, a people cannot govern itself as a free people. But
neither virtue nor moral truth can be legislated. The rule of law under
constitutionalism is the most successful human arrangement for providing
freedom and allowing moral action on the part of individuals.
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I will begin with a modest claim for morality and end with a strong one.
The modest claim is that the state is not founded or logically dependent on any
particular moral theory. Rather it is justifiable primarily on grounds of practical
necessity. We cannot do without it. Even a weak or inadequate state may be far
preferable to no state at all.
I. HUMAN NATURE
The reason for this lies with human nature. Human beings are both social
and rational. They prefer, or even require, group affiliation and the
interdependence that grows out of it. The essence of humanity is reflected in
language, which in turn is a reflection of this basic sociability and rationality.
Without group affiliation, there could be no language.
But human nature is also radically individual. Each man and woman
possesses a body and a mind which constitute a permanent boundary between that
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individual and all others. No other individual can ever think or feel exactly what
any given individual thinks and feels. Each individual experiences the world from
a unique perspective that cannot be shared fully by anyone else. Each individual
makes countless choices, usually within a context of rules provided by the larger
group, which choices over time define the character of the individual chooser.
With the passage of time, individuality grows out of sociality and becomes
increasingly pronounced.1
In a world of scarcity, where every individual cannot have everything he or
she might desire, individuality inevitably generates conflicts of interest and of
view. But conflicts threaten group affiliation. And rationality suggests that
routinized conflict resolution mechanisms might regulate the effects of
individuality and make group affiliation an enduring possibility.
Such mechanisms would not be necessary if men and women were
essentially different than they seem to be. If men were disposed to seek the
interest of all others before their own, individuality would promote social harmony
and productivity, and not threaten it. If such altruistic beings were free from the
limitations of ignorance and were capable of always drawing the right conclusions
from their store of total knowledge, their well motivated actions would always
benefit the other members of the group.
But men are not yet gods. They are, by and large, corruptible, in that they
can be tempted to sacrifice the good of others for private advantage. And their
ignorance is far greater than their knowledge. Even when motivated by good will,
we don't often know what the real consequences of our choices might be. And
benevolent action may not always be helpful to others in the long run. Even when
our information or knowledge is adequate, we do not always reach the right
conclusions. Our powers of reason and inference are imperfect. We make many
mistakes.2
This is not the argument of some theologies that man is essentially evil. Nor
does it deny that there are many people who are routinely benevolent in their
actions. It is a recognition of the weaknesses of men that can come out in
unpredictable ways and affect our ability to live together, and that make life
without some community conflict resolution process unattractive.
II. LAW
1
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The idea of a neutral social mechanism for resolving disputes is the idea of
law. Coercion is a necessary adjunct to law to make it credible. But coercion is
not the essential characteristic of the law. Its essential characteristic is that of
facilitating individual action and choices by assuring all individuals of a
predictable, neutral and orderly mechanism of resolving conflicts that may arise
between individuals while pursuing their own ends.
But human nature constitutes an additional threat to this process of law in
that the process can only be administered by men, who necessarily have their own
interests and weaknesses, which in turn have the potential to interfere with the
neutrality of the legal process or to reduce its predictability. The law addresses
these issues in various ways, primarily by specifying in advance the means of
identifying future administrators of the law and the rules by which future conflicts
will be resolved.
Because the interests of individuals often lead them to join groups whose
interests are similar, factions naturally emerge in a society of law and sometimes
attempt to subvert the legal process for their own advantage. The dangers of
anarchy are reduced by law, but not eliminated. Rather, they are organized and
elevated to a higher level.
By founding the state on our needs we can explain it fully in terms of the
purposes and choices of individuals. Although it may well be true that there are
moral theories that could be developed as fundamental justifications of the state,
that approach is not necessary. And the advantage of taking the minimalist
approach is that the locus of purposes and objectives for human action is clearly
with the individual, the family and the voluntary association of individuals. Men
may be seeking the highest moral achievements on either the individual or social
level. But those pursuits are essentially private. The state is their facilitator.
Virtue remains private in a fundamental way.
Furthermore, had we chosen to develop a rationale for the state out of a
particular moral theory, the resulting state would have to be one in which that
moral theory was authoritative. It would inevitably be accorded legal status. And
morality, in effect, would be nationalized. Individual differences of moral view
could not enjoy equal legal standing, because there would be a national norm.
And any individual choices or pursuits not in conformity with the authoritative
moral point of view would be subject to regulation, or even extirpation.
One reason the approach through law does not require an undergirding
moral theory is that the idea of law has within it certain implicit norms or
principles that are quasi-moral in function, if not in character. These norms will
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provide metalegal standards or criteria against which both the rules and the
procedures of a legal system may be evaluated without bowing either to the
interests or the moral theories of any particular faction.
III. THE RULE OF LAW
The idea of law leads us therefore, to the rule of law, the rule of neutral
rules rather than of any individual or group that can judge arbitrarily according to
its will. The opposite of rule of law would be rule of will or tyranny. By
establishing the same legal rules and procedures as binding on all members of the
community, including those who make or administer the law, the opportunity of
manipulating the legal system for the advantage of a faction or an individual is
theoretically eliminated.
To the extent a society can achieve the rule of law in this sense, legal rules
are like the laws of nature.3 For just as our knowledge of natural laws enables us
to predict with reasonably accuracy the probable outcomes of a huge range of
possible actions from which we might want to choose, so our knowledge of the
law enables us to predict the probable legal consequences of all our choices. Just
as our understanding of the immutable laws of nature enables us to avoid many
natural dangers, so our grasp of the law in a society ruled by law enables us to
avoid actions that would bring the sanctions of law on our heads. And in each
case, the knowledge serves to facilitate intelligent individual action in pursuit of
individually chosen objectives, without imposing a single set of authoritative
objectives on anyone.
Rule of law then serves to protect us from coercion in three directions. By
submitting to a society of law, we can avoid the totally unpredictable and
unpreventable predatory coercions of anarchy. Second, by obeying the law, we
can avoid the sanctions prescribed for law-breakers. And third, the rule of law
prevents factions from perverting the system and engaging in entrepreneurial
coercion for their own advantage.
Rule of law can now be seen to provide a comprehensive theory of
freedom. The freedom provided in a society of law consists in protection from the
arbitrary coercive intrusions of others in one's life. It is not derived from any
theory of natural rights, but sees rights as creations of law. The rights that count
in society are essentially legal. And one's property is constituted by the collection
of one's legal rights. One is free to the extent that others cannot invade one's
rights with impunity.
3
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This brief account may be adequate to initiate an analysis of the principles
and assumptions implicit in the idea of rule of law. The vision of a system of law
that provides stable and impartial standards for all suggests some general criteria
for determining the extent to which any particular society attains to rule of law.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF THE RULE OF LAW
The most important criterion for rule of law is generality.4 It is the
requirement that laws and procedures binding on anyone are binding on everyone.
Stated negatively, it is the principle that no identifiable individuals or groups can
be singled out by law or procedure for special benefits or penalties. The principle
specifically includes the officers of the law, both those who make it and those who
enforce it. They are subject to all the same rules and procedures as everyone else.
The classic example of the violation of this principle is the bill of attainder, which
is disallowed under the American Constitution, and the special bills according
benefits to particular individuals, that are still commonly accepted by the
U. S. Congress as a matter of congressional courtesy.
Of course, the law can prescribe different benefits and penalties to people
not identifiable in advance who might meet certain general criteria. This only
works if the criteria serve to guide the choices people make, but not if it they bring
the coercive weight of the law on people that have no way of avoiding it. It is true
that general categories can be so narrowly defined as to in effect single out
identifiable individuals or groups. But to the extent this ruse is allowed, rule of
law is sacrificed.
The second principle, sometimes, confused with the first, is equality. It
sometimes helps to distinguish it from notions of material equality by calling it
"formal" or "legal" equality. The principle requires that the society not be divided
into legal classes that have systematically different standing with respect to the
rules and procedures of the law. Equality before the law means that every
individual is subject to the same rules and procedures and is protected by the same
sets of rights and procedures as every other individual.
Both generality and equality are important in eliminating discrimination
from the law. The principle of generality allows the law to create legal categories
of persons for different social purposes and only prevents the law being used to
harm or benefit antecedently identifiable individuals or groups. The principle of
equality requires that no groups be systematically privileged or prejudiced by the
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substance or process of law.
The third fundamental principle of rule of law is prospectivity. It is the
requirement that any change or addition to the law refer only to the future in the
sense that past actions cannot be reclassified retroactively to change their legal
implications. A legislature that can change the legal status of past actions can
condemn anyone it chooses, thus replacing rule of law with tyranny. The
American Constitution provides for this simply with the prohibition against ex
post facto laws. The expectation is that every individual can calculate the future
legal consequences of present choices without fear that the rules will be changed
retroactively.
In spite of the analogy between the laws of society and the laws of nature,
there is also a profound difference. The laws of society are not immutable. Not
only can they change over time, but they must do so. Even in traditional societies
some social change is necessitated by changing circumstances. And if the rules of
society cannot be adjusted to meet these changes, the level of social support for
the laws will decline. So even though the idea of law in principle favors stasis to
enable long range predictability, in practice, social and technological change
require continual adjustments in the legal system. The challenge for rule of law is
then to provide mechanisms of change that maximize predictability and minimize
uncertainty. Achieving rule of law in a dynamic society requires processes of
change and adjustment in the law that reflect the basic principles of rule of law.
V. CONSTITUTIONALISM
Constitutions are devices for preserving the rule of law under conditions of
change. Constitutions come into being as implicit or even written agreements
about how changes in the law will or will not be made. Law is therefore both
logically and historically prior to a constitution. Because the inevitable changes
that must be made in the laws over time tend to decrease the value of prospectivity
in the law, constitutions are necessary to establish in advance what the
mechanisms of change will be and to minimize changes that could not themselves
be predicted. Because our mortality limits the tenure of all public officials,
constitutions must also provide mechanisms for selecting and installing new
authorities.
Constitutions are often mistakenly thought to be statements of true moral or
political principles that govern a society. A glance at the world's most successful
constitutions immediately discloses the error of this assumption. These
constitutions do little more than set up institutional devices that are designed to
frustrate factions and eliminate practices that might endanger rule of law. The
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American Constitution is a deliberately complicated set of procedures for
changing and enforcing the law that make it nearly impossible for any single
faction to gain control over all aspects of the process. It erects a set of practical
obstacles to tyranny. But it announces no authoritative moral or political
principles.
Constitutions are, however, designed according to certain principles or
understandings about what kinds of provisions are necessary or helpful in
preserving rule of law through the frustration of factions. The principle of consent
is now almost universally recognized as one means of ensuring that a population is
not exploited against its own will. By incorporating the principle of publicity,
constitutions require legislative and judicial bodies to deliberate and make
decisions before the public eye, thus restricting the opportunity for secret factional
arrangements. And constitutions provide extra protection for the procedural
safeguards of the law. These procedures are designed to protect the individual
participant in the legal process from being unfairly treated or judged.
Most constitutions provide for the separation of powers, or the separation
of the law making and law enforcing functions of government. This arrangement
protects against the eventuality that law makers might use their unequalled powers
for private advantage. Someone else will enforce the laws they make. In the
American system, the principle of federalism is used in a unique way to divide
public authority between different levels of government, again frustrating factional
ambitions. Numerous checks and balances between the different branches of
government are designed to preserve the effectiveness of the separation of powers
by maintaining the independence of the various officers of the government.5
Constitutions are not statements of moral principles and rights. Rather, they
are structured combinations of procedures, prohibitions, and institutional devices,
all designed to provide for limited government and to frustrate tyranny.
Constitutionalism is, therefore, the science of limiting governments by such
devices. It is not just another name for rule of law, but is the study of the means of
achieving and maintaining rule of law. The institutional devices recommended by
constitutionalist thinkers are not ends in themselves, but are contrivances designed
to discourage rule of will and maximize rule of law over the long run.
VI. REPUBLICAN VIRTUE
Given the commitment of the American founding to these kinds of
principles, some commentators have attacked it for its denial of any need for
5
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morality or devotion to the public good.6 But such critics need to look further to
find the essential and even dominant role of the moral argument in the American
founding. Sam Adam's phrase, "a Christian Sparta," illustrates the way that the
Americans saw two great moral traditions of almost equal antiquity coming
together in their own brand of republicanism. Classical republican thought goes
back to those great philosophers of the early decline of Rome who longed
hopelessly for the simpler and more virtuous world of the early republic--Cicero,
Tacitus, and Plutarch. Americans, like their radical republican predecessors in
England, idealized the Roman republicans, and used their names repeatedly as
authorities in argument and even as pen names.7
Like those ancient Romans and like contemporary republicans in Europe,
the Americans saw the corruption of liberty resulting from the corruption of
individual citizens through luxury, dependence and moral flabbiness. But to this
ancient republican axiom, the Americans added the dimension of Christian faith.
The Puritan mission to found in the New World "a citty on a hill" evolved into a
mission to establish a Christian republic. And the corruptions and luxuries that
were believed by republicans to undermine free societies, were also believed by
the Americans to be abominable before God and bound to be punished by his
wrath.
Republicanism had both a political and a moral thesis. Politically it denoted
limited, popular government based on some scheme of representation, but not
direct (or "pure") democracy. The "radical republicans" of 17th and 18th century
England had first been concerned to establish the pre-eminence of Parliament over
the king. The Glorious Revolution produced a permanent solution by establishing
a revised balance between King and Parliament. Their second concern was to
prevent the "corruption" of Parliament by the king and his ministers. By the first
decades of the eighteenth century, the constitutionally limited king had found
ways to buy influence in Parliament, trading "places" or public appointments for
votes.
The Americans picked up these radical republican themes and adopted them
as mainline political wisdom, insisting on actual (rather than "virtual")
representation in Parliament. Republicanism held that the liberty of the people
was a function of their moral independence and resistance to the corruptions of
6
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luxury. It rejected the older patronage system based on social relations of
dependence and subservience in favor of a society based on natural merit and
equality of independent citizens linked to one another in harmony. As individual
property holders, republican citizens would rise above a narrow selfish
individualism in promoting social cohesion and the common welfare. This ideal
was reflected in the choice of some new states to style themselves
"commonwealths." But they recognized that theirs was a fragile ideal. Holland
and the Italian and Swiss city-states were the only contemporary examples of
republican government. And these were tiny and endangered by faction. The
English experiment of 1642 had failed.
American republicanism demanded an extraordinary moral quality in its
people. This was called "patriotism" or "virtue" or public virtue. Patriots must
eschew the selfish pursuit of luxuries. They must regard one another as moral and
legal equals. The extraordinary displays of popular order in 1774-75 during times
of breakdown in royal government convinced Americans that they were naturally
virtuous in this way and therefore ideally suited as a population for an experiment
in republican government.
Implicit in this concept of the republican citizen was a recognition that
liberty is only possible for a people that can govern themselves at the level of the
individual. Republican men must by and large be capable of holding themselves
to principles of equity and fair action in their conduct with others. The anti-social
calculator of narrow self-interest who deliberately violates law and morals when it
suits his advantage, is a threat to the fabric of freedom. But a free society can only
control his activities at the borders. And if his amoral style becomes widely
emulated, liberty will be reduced as government steps in to give stronger guidance
to a citizenry that has proven incapable of governing itself.
The American republicans believed that "patriots" could not be courtiers.
They must be free of corrupting dependency connections, being tied to their
associates only by "friendship connections" and a shared love of their country.
Jefferson argued that dependency begets subservience and venality, suffocates the
germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition."
Individual ownership of property was viewed as essential to foster this
"independency." Property provided an economic basis for independence.
Property creates a permanent attachment to the welfare of the community. The
propertyless could be denied the vote because of their dependency and
vulnerability to influence, "having no wills of their own." Some states allowed
established artisans the same rights as property holders reasoning that they had a
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similar independence. Jefferson at one point recommended that Virginia give 50
acres of land to each citizen. Jefferson's idea that a republic was safe only in the
hands of yeoman farmers was largely derivative from this same reasoning.
The social emphasis on friendship connections and the frontier conditions of
relative economic and social equality produced a pervasive assumption that the
citizens of the American republic should treat each other as moral and political
equals. Artificially based inequalities were no longer acceptable. Legal privileges
of an established aristocracy must be abolished. Social mobility based on merit
and effort would prevent further hardening of social distinctions. A natural
aristocracy might therefore emerge, but with no means of perpetuating itself across
generations.
Liberty under republican principles also required one additional form of
public virtue. The institutions of liberty will not function well if every citizen acts
only because of calculated self-interest. Each individual citizen, on careful
reflection, will discover that the effort it takes to be an informed and active voter,
a participant in public councils and committees, and even an elected official, will
almost never bring in a positive return. The benefits of these kinds of action are
distributed throughout the population, and the individual who makes these
contributions captures only a tiny portion. But republican liberty is
self-government, and it cannot endure if the population will not exert itself
voluntarily without immediate tangible rewards to maintain and service the
institutions of liberty.
Critics who have accused this republican tradition of constitutionalism of
ignoring morality have taken the arguments of Adams and Madison out of
context. It is true that many eighteenth century thinkers did believe that
constitutional devices could be so designed as to harness self-seeking behavior of
public officials for the public good. And as has been pointed out above, their
theory of human nature did not lead them to trust in the good will of the officers of
government. Indeed, they maintained that all men are corruptible. But that is not
the same as claiming that all men are corrupted. And it is the possibility that
corruptible men will not become corrupted that gives substance to the republican
vision.
Madison made it clear that the primary safeguard of freedom was a reliance
on the people, i.e., on public virtue. But experience has taught us the necessity of
"auxiliary precautions."8 And these are the constitutional devices he is defending
8
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in the new constitution. These are the means by which those individuals and
factious groups that are determined to pursue their own interests, even at the
expense of the public good, can be tamed or controlled. Adams' theory of
emulation held that powerful public officials will be constrained by their great
desire for the admiration of an approving public from doing any mischief that
might tarnish that public reputation. Madison's theory held that by dividing up the
powers of government many different ways and giving each department checks on
the others, the self-interest of each group would naturally serve to check the
self-promotion of the others. But these were "auxiliary precautions" taken by men
that recognized the necessity of preparing their government to deal with men of all
varieties of moral fibre. They intended to protect their great republican
experiment from failure at the hands of a corrupted few. But they only believed it
was possible because of the moral virtue of the majority.
Again we see that the system described here is not indifferent to morality.
Rather, it is high moral commitment that makes it possible. But the human pursuit
of moral visions or utopias is left to individuals and to voluntary association. That
responsibility is not taken up by government. The role of government is precisely
to protect and facilitate the actions of free individuals and groups, within the law,
as they pursue their life objectives. The genius of American republicanism is that
it capitalizes on the moral strength of the people without nationalizing the moral
enterprise.
VII. MORALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW
The relationship between morality and the law is therefore not so much
logical in character as causal. The law is not derived logically from accepted true
moral principles. Rather, it is established by legislatures that come to agreement
on public rules that are shaped by a political consensus about right and wrong. In
this political process, people or groups holding different fundamental moral or
religious views are brought into agreement precisely because the laws do not need
to articulate or be tied to fundamental moral truths. Because they only need agree
on consequences and policies, divergent moral points of view can be marshalled in
support of a single piece of legislation.
By this account, morality is intimately involved in the making and changing
of law. But it is never through acknowledgment of an official moral theory that is
legally binding or that occupies some special constitutional status. Rather, the
moral views of the citizenry must work themselves out in the political process
through legislative compromises. Sometimes severe differences of moral principle
make such compromises difficult or impossible as with the abortion issue. But
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even in such cases, the issue of moral differences is firmly restricted to the domain
of politics. Resolution can only come through political resolution. And thus the
pluralist integrity of the society is preserved.
Strong challenges to this view have been raised in recent years by legal
philosophers. In particular, Ronald Dworkin has argued that both laws and
constitutions are unavoidably rooted in political and moral principles.9 In the case
of western liberal democracies, Dworkin finds the principle of equality lurking
behind everything else, and he therefore accords to it the status of a fundamental
constitutional and legal rule. When all else fails, judges are correctly instructed to
invoke this moral principle in the decision of hard cases. The same is true of
rights in general on Dworkin's view. They are grounded in moral principles and
are more binding on judges than any legislative statute. It has been my claim that
this approach, like some of its natural law predecessors, constitutes an attempt to
nationalize morality and institute an official moral view as legally binding on all.
And the issues that should be resolved through the give and take of political
discourse, are urged on our judges as if they were simply questions of law.
Dworkin is candid that one reason for taking his approach is that the judges have
shown themselves to be much more interested in social reform than are the
cumbersome legislatures.10 So he is attracted to the advantages of having small
judicial bodies make the hard social decisions and force the rest of society to move
along more sharply in the way in should be going.
VIII. THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY
On the other hand, Dworkin and most liberals have been strident in their
insistence that judges and legislatures have no business getting involved in matters
of personal immorality.11 Nothing is more certain to attract their ridicule than
defenses of laws punishing the extreme forms of immorality. Yet one common
outcome of legislative deliberations is the statute designed to prevent or punish
gambling, pornography, prostitution, homosexual associations, or drug abuse. The
interesting outcome of interpreting the law as an expression of fundamental moral
principles of liberty or equality is precisely to limit the authority of legislative
assemblies to control the more extreme forms of immoral conduct.
Yet as Patrick Devlin has persuasively argued, if society is a moral as well
9
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as a political association, the core of moral beliefs and practices needs protection.
For once the core of shared moral views and practices is undermined, the threads
holding everything else together will unravel.12 The approach through rule of law
gives us an interesting alternative way to approach this problem. If the citizenry
truly believe that certain behaviors have the potential of destroying or
fundamentally damaging a society, who has the right to tell them they can do
nothing to prevent it? Are they to stand by while an impertinent and irreverent
few carry on in all forms of self-indulgence that the majority honestly believe will
undermine their own future quality of life and the future of their children? Why
can they not act to protect their future lives from such external effects?
A family is not a totally flexible organization. Its effectiveness and
continuity are conditional on the adherence of family members to basic norms of
affection, loyalty, and mutual support. And it is precisely these norms that are
undermined when family members get involved with pornography, prostitution,
abortion, gambling, drinking, etc. Though there may be an infinite array of family
destroying vices to which men and women can succumb, those that are widely
recognized as regularly posing substantial threats to family have often been
prohibited by legislation designed to punish the family threatening behavior. Such
laws even go beyond threats to actual families by trying to protect potential
families. Homosexuality and drug abuse are commonly restricted, and they
endanger the upcoming generation's ability to establish strong new families.
If there is an official moral theory, judges can use it to frustrate such laws.
Without it, legislatures and judges are still bound by all the considerations of rule
of law. And they cannot use such laws to harass selected individuals. But as long
as the legislature and the prosecutors adhere to the principles of generality, formal
equality, and prospectivity, the rule of law itself will not prohibit such legislation.
It is everywhere evident to the honest observer, that laws punishing immorality are
notorious for their tendency to abuse people and to corrupt the legal process. That
is a note of caution to those who support such laws and recognize the fundamental
value of rule of law. But it does not exclude such legal projects in principle.
IX. MORALITY AS AN ECONOMIC RESOURCE
I have made much of the fact that the moral quality of the citizenry is an
irreplaceable resource for the political system. Free government requires it. But it
should also be pointed out, in a day when the economy and the state have become
so closely intertwined, that the strength of the economy is dependent on the moral
12
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strength of the population. A strong market economy depends on a productive
labor force, on people who work regularly, dependably, intelligently, and
honestly. It also requires a people who observe the law and the rules of commerce
largely out of habit and self-governance, that the excess product of the economic
process is not eaten up in the endless demand for enforcement of the law. In other
words, in spite of the fact that some economists teach us to think of a market
economy as a process governed only by the pursuit of selfinterest, the economy's
function is heavily dependent on the level of moral conduct between the economic
actors at every level.
Both the state and the economy are heavily dependent on the moral quality
of the population. It would then seem that from the perspective of either, there is
strong reason to do whatever is possible to encourage those moral qualities, and at
the very least to avoid destroying them. But the state that has no official morality
is not in a good position to inculcate moral values directly. Mediating institutions
such as the family and the church are in far the strongest position to do this
effectively.
One of the great ironies of the welfare state has been that it was
instituted to protect and strengthen individuals and families. But instead it seems
to be weakening them through the institutionalization of family dependency. The
public sector has increased its spending from 12 to 40 percent of our national
income in the last 50 years. And now over half of all Americans are dependent for
some of their income on government spending.13 Family independency has
contributed a great deal to make America the success it has become. But with the
institution of the welfare state we have come increasingly to regard employment
and income, education, medical care, child care and many other forms of aid as
entitlements that we have a right to expect the state to provide. The welfare state
dream may be turning into a nightmare.
Long term government welfare is often linked to the worst statistics in
measures of family stability. For example, the recent income maintenance
experiments in both Denver and Seattle resulted in increased divorce rates as the
costs of divorce were reduced.14 The evidence is convincing more and more
researchers that welfare reduces family cohesion, resiliency in the face of
13
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challenges, and commitment to the moral norms that are essential to the
perpetuation of strong families. Indeed, we are faced with the growing possibility
that the billions we have spent to help the unfortunate may be both harming those
it is designed to help and undermining the system that has made it possible to pay
for the experiment.
Welfare recipients are not the only families that may be directly affected by
welfare state policies and attitudes. Many observers are also alarmed by the
increasing tendency of economically independent families to pass traditional
family responsibilities to the state. Schools and day care facilities, social security
and medicaid, combine with numerous other programs to absorb more and more
functions of the family, reducing the family from its position as basic economic
and moral unit of the society to a hotel or club taking care of a much narrower and
less compelling range of the needs of its individual members. This kind of
concern is much more difficult to assess because so many of these external
resources are truly assets to families which free family members for other
activities that may be of much greater value to the family. But in many cases the
real result is that family interdependency is weakened, and other key family
functions suffer before people realize what is happening to them.15
Both the state and the economy are institutions that facilitate the private
actions of individuals, families and private associations. But just as these need the
state and the market to serve them in this role, the state and the economy need
them as conveyors of the moral tradition to rising generations. Moral values are
best taught in early youth in the home, through the institution of the family.
Churches and other voluntary associations may also play significant roles in this
process. But it is hard for governments to do more than reinforce what has been
learned earlier. Governments should adopt policies that reward and protect
virtuous citizens, not giving advantage to the unscrupulous or corrupting the weak
and dependent.
X. CONCLUSIONS
I began with the modest claim for morality that it is not essential logically
for the founding of the state. The reason for this approach was to free the modern
pluralist state from the tyranny of an authoritative moral theory which would be
binding on judges as a part of the law. Instead, I argued that the principles of the
rule of law under the protection of a strong constitution are the best formal
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protections of our freedom and our relationships as equals.
I ended with the strong claim that morality in the sense of public virtue and
moral practice are essential for a population that will govern itself successfully.
The moral fibre of the citizenry determines the levels of freedom that can be
maintained in a society as well as the productivity of the economy. Finally, I
argued that because mediating institutions are the only effective means of
conveying moral beliefs and practices from one generation to another, government
policies that weaken such institutions constitute long term threats to both a free
society and a strong economy.

